Web of Crises in Bangladesh

http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/07/24/web-of-crises/

Mo Chaudhury

Web of crises

July 24, 2013

Photo: bdnews24.com

The year 2013 has seen Bangladesh getting mired in a complex web of interlinked crises that keep escalating. This commentary enumerates these crises and explores the nature of their cross-feeding.

Crisis of justice

This banner crisis of 2013 gained steam in February with the Shahbagh Movement demanding capital punishment for the indicted war criminals of 1971. The crisis of justice, however, is much wider, and encompasses demand for blasphemy law by the religious right and slowly turning wheels of justice for ordinary citizens and minority.

Electoral crisis

The issue of a proper interim government to oversee national elections turned into an irreconcilable political stalemate when the current regime enacted in 2011 the 15th constitutional amendment to get rid of the caretaker government system previously constitutionalised by the 1996 13th Amendment. Also, formal election alliances have turned the AL and BNP into hostages to their extremist partners and driven them too far apart for any meaningful dialogue and compromise solution.

Security, law and order crisis

Undeniably the security situation (murders, rapes, robbery, kidnappings, assaults, property damage, etc.) for ordinary citizens has been worsening in recent times, according to various human rights organizations and the March 2013 Cabinet Division report. Alongside, politically motivated crimes and violence including extrajudicial abductions and killings are also on the rise. Such violations spiked in 2013 as political turmoil intensified.

Freedom of expression crisis

While the liberty of expression and association has been under transgression by various regimes since 1971, the situation has become quite abject in recent times. Whether it is ordinary a citizen or blogger, media editor or commentator, writer or member of civil society, or member/activist of political parties, no one feels safe in expressing themselves freely without the fear of threat and/or punitive retribution from the forces adversely or critically reflected upon.

Governance crisis

Over time, influence peddling and corruption have become pervasive, most recently illustrated by the Padma Bridge financing fiasco, share market scam, and the banking scams. Two key drivers of the ever escalating governance crisis are the Party First, Country Second (PFCS) politics by the major political parties, in position or opposition, and the lucrative financial dividend from governance power.

Cross-Feeding of crises

Let us start with the ruling party's realisation that, to win the next electoral contest or to survive the loss afterwards, it needs to beef up financial and organisational resources, while drawing down the same for the opposition. Carrying out this plan necessarily involves widespread influence peddling and PFCS actions across the entire governance machinery including law making, law enforcement actions and judicial interventions and abuses. Thus comes to being the core governance crisis.

To enhance the chances of forming the government and/or to pursue vigorous opposition campaign to dislodge the government, the leading parties find election alliances with the extremist parties to be a necessity and thereby end up yielding to extremist agendas. Further, a ruling party sees competitive edge in changing the interim government format. Of course, the opposition perceives such a change unfavourable to it, and hence attempts to stage ceaseless programmes of disruptive protest activities and aligns even more strongly with its extremist partners. Thus is born the electoral crisis.

As the electoral crisis heats up, staying in power becomes more challenging and the chances of winning the next election becomes more uncertain. The governance crisis then gets deeper since the ruling party engages in even more influence peddling and PFCS governance actions. Meantime, as the opposition senses urgency to survive and to remain relevant, they counteract with their own violent reprisals. The regime's partisan law enforcement lieutenants then carry out orders to brutally and selectively crackdown on the opposition activists. The law and order crisis is now in full swing.

The electoral crisis also spawns the crisis of justice. With an eye on the forthcoming election, the ruling party elongates the war crimes proceedings while leaving room for rigging and revisiting the judicial verdicts. This, however, creates a double-edged crisis of justice, seemingly contradictory (to the fairness of the trial) demand of the Projonmo Movement for capital punishment of the indicted war criminals and the opposition alliance crying foul of the legal process and the regime's overt support to the Projonmo Movement. The atheist belief of the bloggers leading the Projonmo Movement adds fuel to the fire as the opposition redefines the crisis of justice along the fault line of religious belief and finds an ally in Hifazat-e Islam that launches an agitated movement for blasphemy law.

The regime feels even more defensive and aggressively abuses the justice system to jail the opposition leaders and activists on frivolous charges of violence while the latter respond with more strikes and violent protests. Concurrently, the regime drags its feet on dealing justice to the perpetrators of banking and market scams, corruptions (including Padma Bridge financing), politically motivated (like killing of Biswajit and Touki) and general crimes (like murder of Sagar-Runi) against ordinary citizens, crimes against minority (like Ramu-Ukhia) and fatal industrial incidents (like Tazreen factory fire and collapse of Rana Plaza).

Battered by the various crises and unable to contain the opposition, the regime turns desperate to change and control the political narratives and hence embarks upon a regressive campaign of choking up dissents, critiques (individual, political and media) and legitimate political activities (meetings, processions), and repressively controlling the flow of potentially damaging information about its activities (like shutting down media outlets in the midst of late night crack down on unarmed civilians at the Shapla Chottor). With less intensity, but surely, the opposition mounts its own violent campaign of silencing individuals (like the Prajanma bloggers, relative of WCT witness, Fatikchari victims, people defying opposition hartals) perceived to be detrimental to their causes. The nation thus dives into its worst freedom of expression crisis since the ill-perceived BAKSAL experiment after the Liberation War.

In conclusion, it is important to notice that the web of crises (electoral, the law and order, justice and freedom of expression) is fundamentally woven by the aggressive quest of the major political parties to retain or regain governance power and thereby reap the ever increasing governance dividends in the form of financial riches for the party, its leaders, activists and business supporters. Therefore, any long-term and comprehensive solution to the web of 2013 crises would require a roadmap or mechanism to address the core crisis of governance. Meantime, a meaningful step in the right direction would be to dissolve and ban election alliances.

———————————–
Mo Chaudhury is a professor of Practice at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The graph in the original version that might aid exposition of the cross-feeding of the crises.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The original draft

May 15, 2013  

Web of 2013 Crises in Bangladesh

By

Mo Chaudhury

The year 2013 has seen Bangladesh getting mired in a complex web of interlinked crises that keep escalating. This commentary enumerates these crises and explores the nature of their cross-feeding.

 

Crisis of justice: This banner crisis of 2013 gained steam in February with the Projonmo Movement demanding capital punishment for the indicted war criminals of 1971. The crisis of justice, however, is much wider, and encompasses demand for blasphemy law by the religious right and slowly turning wheels of justice for ordinary citizens and minority.

 

Electoral crisis: The issue of a proper interim government to oversee national elections turned into an irreconcilable political stalemate when the current regime enacted in 2011 the 15th constitutional amendment to get rid of the CTG system previously constitutionalized by the 1996 13^th Amendment. Also, formal election alliances have turned AL and BNP into hostages to their extremist partners and driven them too far apart for any meaningful dialogue and compromise solution.

 

Security and law and order crisis: Undeniably the security situation (murders, rapes, robbery, kidnappings, assaults, property damage, etc.) for ordinary citizens has been worsening in recent times, according to various human right organizations and the March 2013 Cabinet Division report. Alongside, politically motivated crimes and violence including extrajudicial abductions and killings are also on the rise. Such violations spiked in 2013 as political turmoil intensified.  

 

Freedom of expression crisis: While the liberty of expression and association has been under transgression by various regimes since 1971, the situation has become quite abject in recent times. Whether it is ordinary citizen or blogger, media editor or commentator, writer or member of civil society, or member/activist of political parties, no one feels safe in expressing themselves freely without the fear of threat and/or punitive retribution from the forces adversely or critically reflected upon.

 

Governance crisis: Over time, influence peddling and corruption have become pervasive, most recently illustrated by the Padma Bridge financing fiasco, share market scam, and the banking scams. Two key drivers of the ever escalating governance crisis are the Party First Country Second (PFCS) politics by the major political parties, in position or opposition, and the lucrative financial dividend from governance power.

 

 

Cross-Feeding of crises:

 

Let us start with the ruling party's realization that, to win the next electoral contest or to survive the loss afterwards, it needs to beef up financial and organizational resources, while drawing down the same for the opposition. Carrying out this plan necessarily involves widespread influence peddling and PFCS actions across the entire governance machinery including law making, law enforcement actions and judicial interventions and abuses. Thus comes to being the core governance crisis.

 

To enhance the chances of forming the government and/or to pursue vigorous opposition campaign to dislodge the government, the leading parties find election alliances with the extremist parties to be a necessity and thereby end up yielding to extremist agendas [Price of electoral win, The Daily Star, March 07, 2013]. Further, a ruling party sees competitive edge in changing the interim government format. Of course, the opposition perceives such a change unfavorable to it, and hence attempts to stage ceaseless programs of disruptive protest activities and aligns even more strongly with its extremist partners. Thus is born the electoral crisis.

 

As the electoral crisis heats up, staying in power becomes more challenging and the chances of winning the next election becomes more uncertain. The governance crisis then gets deeper since the ruling party engages in even more influence peddling and PFCS governance actions. Additionally, the pro-regime violent activists are awarded de facto licenses to engage in extortion, robbery, battery and murder. Meantime, as the opposition senses urgency to survive and to remain relevant, they counteract with their own violent reprisals. The regime's partisan law enforcement lieutenants then carry out orders to brutally and selectively crackdown on the opposition activists. The law and order crisis is now in full swing.

 

The electoral crisis also spawns the crisis of justice. With an eye on the forthcoming election, the ruling party elongates the war crimes proceedings while leaving room for rigging and revisiting the judicial verdicts. This, however, creates a double-edged crisis of justice, seemingly contradictory (to the fairness of the trial) demand of the Projonmo Movement for capital punishment of the indicted war criminals and the opposition alliance crying foul of the legal process and the regime's overt support to the Projonmo Movement. The atheist belief of the bloggers leading the Projonmo Movement adds fuel to the fire as the opposition redefines the crisis of justice along the fault line of religious belief and finds an ally in Hefajate Islam that launches an agitated movement for blasphemy law.    

 

The regime feels even more defensive and aggressively abuses the justice system to jail the opposition leaders and activists on frivolous charges of violence while the latter respond with more strikes and violent protests. Concurrently, the regime drags its feet on dealing justice to the perpetrators of banking and market scams, corruptions (including Padma Bridge financing), politically motivated (like murders of Biswajit and Touki) and general crimes (like murder of Sagar-Runi) against ordinary citizens, crimes against minority (like Ramu-Ukhia) and fatal industrial incidents (like Tazrin factory fire and collapse of Rana Plaza).

 

Battered by the various crises and unable to contain the opposition, the regime turns desperate to change and control the political narratives and hence embarks upon a regressive campaign of choking up dissents, critiques (individual, political and media) and legitimate political activities (meetings, processions), and repressively controlling the flow of potentially damaging information about its activities (like shutting down media outlets in the midst of late night barbaric crack down on unarmed civilians at the Shapla Chottor). With less intensity, but surely, the opposition mounts its own violent campaign of silencing individuals (like the Projonmo bloggers, relative of WCT witness, Fatikchari victims, people defying opposition hartals) perceived to be detrimental to their causes. The nation thus dives into its worst freedom of expression crisis since the ill-perceived BAKSAL experiment after liberation.   

 

In conclusion, it is important to notice that the web of crises (electoral, the law and order, justice and freedom of expression) is fundamentally woven by the aggressive quest of the major political parties to retain or regain governance power and thereby reap the ever increasing governance dividends in the form of financial riches for the party, its leaders, activists and business supporters. Therefore, any long-term and comprehensive solution to the web of 2013 crises would require a roadmap or mechanism to address the core crisis of governance [How to establish clean governance, Financial Express, September 08, 2012]. Meantime, a meaningful step in the right direction would be to dissolve and ban election alliances [Election alliances in Bangladesh, The Daily Star, November 17, 2012].

 

                 

Information about the Author: Mo Chaudhury, Ph.D., is a Professor of Practice at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Email: mo.chaudhury@mcgill.ca, mochaudhury@gmail.com.

Politics, religion and partisanship

http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/politics-religion-and-partisanship/

Politics, religion and partisanship

Mo Chaudhury

    

 

POLITICS and religion are, by their very nature, contentious and divisive, and as such hotly contested and debated. This commentary explores what could make such contests over politics and religion conducive for all contestants, that is, the society at large.

Both politics and religion require membership or subscription to ideology, of governance and divinity respectively, thus making the political or religious faithful a partisan in the related sphere. A partisan is "a firm adherent to a party, faction, cause, or person; especially one exhibiting blind, prejudiced, and unreasoning allegiance." The word "adherent" suggests conviction or steadfastness of the support; it is not casual or temporary support as in the case of selecting to vote for a party in a given election. Further, extreme partisanship is characterised by blinding bias, emotion, prejudice and irrationality, known as fanaticism, "marked by excessive enthusiasm and often intense uncritical devotion." Importantly, thus, there are more political fanatics, ethnic fanatics, etc., than there are perhaps religious fanatics.

What would make partisan debates and contests over politics and religion fruitful or harmful for the society? First, for focused and orderly formation of public opinion, the major political parties should offer reasoned articulation of their partisan visions. For example, on the issue of interim government, AL should advocate why the caretaker government (CTG) system is no more suitable and the new constitutionally amended system is better. Similarly, BNP should explain why the CTG system has now become so indispensable.

Second, vital for a vibrant democracy, is the ability to debate freely. Democracy works well on the basis of consensus developed via engaging contests of competing visions of the nation. The prime minister and the leader of the opposition are to protect and promote the rights of all citizens, not just their respective partisans. Filling up jail cells and clogging up courts with dissidents and partisan dissenters cannot be beneficial, and neither can be ceaseless disruptive efforts to bring down an elected government.

Importantly, the political nonpartisans must also support the right of all to voice dissent. Here, it was a pivotal mistake for the Projonmo Movement to vilify critics of the movement as neo-razakars and anti-liberation forces. It is equally unfair for Hefajat-e-Islam to demand (capital) punishment for atheist bloggers and thus deny them the right to express their views. Further, punitive actions in the name of protecting the honour of government and historical leaders might have strengthened the Hefajat's demand for religious blasphemy law.

Third, the anti-partisan form of partisanship is by definition adversarial and divisive. The Projonmo Movement started in pro-partisan form demanding long awaited due justice for the victims of 1971. But as the Movement strayed into anti-partisanship (antagonistic to non-secular forces as well as their secular but religious partisan allies), the cause of justice was lost as the contest was permitted to be defined along the line of religious partisanship.

Fourth, most religions prescribe a way of life and a system of values, and as such issues related to religion are bound to crop up in national politics. Such religion-cum-political debates are a no win situation for the nation as the differences can rarely be reconciled. It thus makes sense to avoid hostile anti-partisanship and to show sufficient enough sensitivity to religious values.

Fifth, religion based politics is to be distinguished from the politics of religion. While religion-based politics aspire to institute state governance according to the divine codes, politics of religion exploits religious sentiments for popularity. In a society committed to freedom of expression, religion-based politics and partisanship is legitimate. But politics of religion is cheap and opportunistic, and the nation is better off having less of it.

Unfortunately, politics of religion aggravated the recent political turmoil in Bangladesh. Clearly, the atheist belief of some bloggers has little to do with the demand for justice for the war crimes. On the other hand, the Liberation War had little to do with religion-based politics. Similarly, alliance with ultra-secular parties does not make AL anti-religion, and alliance with religion-based parties does not make BNP anti-secular or anti-liberation. The two camps, however, keep hurling these unfounded allegations as part of their political propaganda.

Sixth, while political partisanship is a necessity, partisan politics is detrimental as it sacrifices the nation's interest for perceived gains to the party and/or its leaders and activists. The Padma Bridge fiasco, dealing with the Grameen Bank, the railway scandal, and the handling of banking and financial scams are some recent examples. Such partisan politics has historically been a nagging and debilitating phenomenon since liberation.

Lastly, but most crucially, moderate partisanship is the most conducive and fanatic partisanship is the most harmful to a democratic society. Allegiance and fervour turn into fanaticism in the absence of critique and reasoning, as suggested by the dictionary definition. In recent times, fanaticism has become synonymous with religious fundamentalism, especially that of the Muslims. Meantime, people have become complacent with political fanaticism (fascism, communism/socialism) that has historically done enormously more harm to human societies including Bangladesh.

To come out of the present dire state of affairs in Bangladesh, the narratives of the principal contestants and the citizenship at large have to change, keeping in mind that there is no greater ideal in human societies than the freedom of expression and association for all. The words "freedom" and "for all" are the all important words, because together they define tolerance of dissenting views. With such tolerance (flexible mindset) comes reasoned partisanship instead of emotional fanaticism, be it political or religious, and hopefully also less of politics of religion and partisan politics. The key is to learn to agree to disagree in a respectful manner.

The writer is a Professor of Practice in Finance at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
Email: mo.chaudhury@mcgill.ca

Betrayers of people's interest are the Neo-Razakars

http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/04/29/betrayers-of-peoples-interest/

Mo Chaudhury

Betrayers of people's interest

April 29, 2013

Photo: bdnews24.com

The historical betrayal of the people of Bengal by Mir Jafar Ali Khan in the 18th century is held with such disdain that the name Mir Jafar is synonymous with treachery among Bangalis. Two centuries later, Razakar became a despised word and a malignant identity to most Bangladeshis proudly memorialising the sacrifices of the martyrs but tormented by the betrayal and atrocities of the local collaborators of the invading forces during the nation's 1971 Liberation War. Forty plus years and generations later, the country's sovereignty is secure, but the life and liberty of its ordinary people and the well-being of the nation remain violated by and subjugated to powerful enemies within. Their betrayal of the interests of the nation and its people is self-serving, systematic, relentless and fatal. These new cancerous forces of betrayal, the Neo-Razakars (Nobbyo Razakar) are entrenched across the political spectrum and various echelons of the society, and they need to be identified by the nature of their actions, namely, betrayal of people's interest.

Much to the despair of the nation, the 2/13 Prajanma Movement lost its footing, impartiality and relevance, partly, if not mainly, because it voiced little resentment against the evils of today's antagonists within, the Neo-Razakars. Rather unfortunately, the Prajanma leadership strayed into the agenda of entrenched partisan forces and engaged in the outrageous practice of labelling their critiques as Neo-Razakars. It is time that the Prajanma leadership and the nation redefined Neo-Razakars, and re-launched the movement against these saboteurs within.

Who should be stigmatized with the label of Neo-Razakar (Nobbyo Razakar)?

Should we not ask the surviving victims and the families of those lost in the collapse of the Rana Plaza in Savar and in the factory (Tazreen) fire of Ashulia? Who do they think they have been betrayed by? Who were fugitives from their leadership and administrative responsibilities in ensuring workplace safety for the hapless workers? Who have not yet criminally punished the lead delinquents in the Ashulia factory fire and the ones before?

Should we not ask the families of those murdered by the convicted criminals who were later 'presidentially' pardoned? Who do they think they have been betrayed by?

Should we not ask the families of the likes of Biswajit, the blown-up policeman on duty, the gunned-down unarmed devotee, the mutilated AL activist in Satkhira, and the nameless and unreported countless others lost in continued political violence raging across the land? Who do they think they have been betrayed by? Who have dragged their feet in bringing the perpetrators to justice? Who bless, incite and finance the foray of violent activism, nurture the culture of politics at gunpoint, and then assure protection, political promotion and financial dividends for the perpetrators?

Should we not ask the families of the likes of brutally murdered bright young chap Tauki in Narayanganj and journalist couple Sagar-Runi and kidnapped little boy Parag Mondol in Dhaka? Who do they think they are being betrayed by? Why the wheels of justice turn, if ever, so slowly and painfully for them? Why security in life and justice in death for their kind matter so little even to the Prajanma Movement?

Should we not ask the Buddhist citizens of Ramu-Ukhia and the violated religious/ethnic minorities like them across the land? Who do they think they are being betrayed by? Who is playing reckless and sub-human politics and endless blame game with their vulnerability? Who is failing to even properly and timely identify their low-life aggressors? How many temples need to be torched and the dignity of how many minority girls would have to be compromised before enough is enough?

Should we not ask the people of southern Bangladesh and for that matter all of Bangladesh why the differential interpretation of what constitutes a bribery crime and the associated international brinkmanship were so much more important than obtaining much needed external financing for the vital Padma Bridge from the international financial institutions? Whose underlying interests prevailed over theirs?

Should we not ask the small investors who were ruthlessly defrauded by the powerful scam artists in the share market? Why the people identified by the government's own investigation are yet to be arraigned and prosecuted? Should we not ask the people of Bangladesh why the looting of their nationally owned banks continued unabated under the surveillance of their elected government? And yet why no government leader of any stature has faced any disciplinary action? Should we not ask the poor member borrowers of the Grameen Bank why they are forced out of governance control of the Nobel winning institution they own?

Should we not ask the people of Bangladesh why do they have to go to jail for defaming important political leaders, but not the holy religious figures of their faith? For that matter, why do the atheist bloggers or the outspoken editors/media outlets have to be punished for their uninhibited opinions, as outlandish and insensitive that may be? Is there any greater human right in a civilized society than the freedom of expression by all? Who is robbing the people of Bangladesh of that very defining liberty the "Muktir Shongram" was about?

Forty plus years since the Liberation War, the ordinary people of Bangladesh are still waiting to be delivered on life, liberty, dignity and equity. The blood of ordinary citizens shed today is fresh and red, the grief of victims is piercing, the agony of helpless suffering is traumatic, and the suffocation of abdicated voices is killing. The Liberation War of the new millennium is to be against the powerful enemies within, the Neo-Razakars.

——————————–
Mo Chaudhury is a Professor of Practice at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Mo Chaudhury

Joy Bangla, Joy Bangladesh

April 3, 2013

A lot has happened since the commencement of the 2/13 (February 2013) Prajanma Chattar Movement, and the nation is now truly under siege, en route to a calamitous total breakdown. The need for the nation to come together and rally for a universally greater purpose has never been more paramount since liberation. It is with this inspirational lifeline in mind, this commentary proposes the addition of the slogan, Joy Bangladesh to the nation's cherished heritage of Joy Bangla. To be certain, Joy Bangla is forever to be in the heart beat of all Bangladeshis and Bangalis at large, it is not to be replaced. However, it can be and needs to be augmented by Joy Bangladesh to celebrate and preserve all the miraculous achievements of the state of Bangladesh since liberation.

Following the hoisting of the Red Green Yellow flag of an independent Bangladesh at the March 2, 1971 Dhaka University rally, Joy Bangla became synonymous with the struggle for liberation on March 7, 1971, when Bangabandhu concluded his memorable speech with Joy Bangla. It is worthwhile to recount what Joy Bangla really represented. The most historical, fundamental and defining aspect of pre-1947 East Bengal and then 1947-1971 East Pakistan is that the culture, civilization and way of life here are intimately and passionately grounded in the maternal langue, Bangla. Intriguingly, while the same applies equally to the Bangalis of West Bengal, the twins would become irreversibly separated state wise in course of the unforgiving history of the Indian subcontinent leading up to 1947. This imposed reality of statewide division was later reinforced by the fact that the Bangalis of West Bengal did not find themselves as ethnically suppressed and vulnerable in post-1947 India as did the Bangalis of East Bengal in the new state of Pakistan. While the West Bengal Bangalis grew accustomed to the state based nationalism of post-1947 India, the East Bengal Bangalis, in the new state of Pakistan, were compelled to actively defend their linguistic and cultural rights starting with the historic 1952 Bhasha Andolon. As the years unfolded, their ethnic nationalism as Bangalis grew steadily stronger than their sense of citizenship of Pakistan under increasingly undemocratic, unjust and outright oppressive governance by the non-Bangali rulers from West Pakistan.

This intertwined development, resentment against citizenship of the nation state of Pakistan and ethnic coalescing as Bangalis first and foremost is the essential genesis of Joy Bangla, it synthesized ethnic nationalism and state based nationalism of a new and independent state where Bangalis would be in control of their destiny, first time in centuries. But critically this new state was clearly not meant to, and could not and would not reclaim the historic territory of Bangla. With the western part missing and no apparent and pragmatic reason for it to directly join the liberation war of the East, the new state could not be named the historic and once undivided Bangla, and so was born in 1971 Bangladesh, the Bangla Desh, the country of Bangla, the language.

Bangladesh, the state, is to Bangalis, the people, what England is to the English speaking people worldwide, France is to the French speaking, Spain is to the Spanish speaking, and so on, it is the emotional home of all Bangalis regardless of their place of birth or state based citizenship. But importantly, Bangladesh is also a politically and geographically defined state. As a state, its successes are earned and its failures are felt overwhelmingly by its citizens, not by all Bangalis worldwide. Also, practices, values and passions developing within a state are not necessarily shared by the same ethnicity elsewhere. As history has it, state based nationalism often, but not always, takes hold and becomes stronger in time, especially with steadfast and glorious achievements of the state. And so are born state based national slogans (like God Bless America, Viva France).

The achievements of Bangladesh as a state since liberation are nothing short of remarkable and are globally recognized so. Once dubbed as a bottomless basket, the economic engine of today's Bangladesh is an envy of the developing nations. According to Index Mundi, in terms of year 2,000 US$, GDP grew from $15.35 billion (1972) to $82.98 billion (2010), GDP per capita rose from $224.21 (1972) to $558.06 (2010), and the Food Production Index (2004-06: 100) tripled from 40 to 121 during the same period. Bangladesh now produces and exports a wide array of manufactured products, with trade as percentage of GDP more than doubling from under 20% (1972) to 43.42% (2009). The country is now the second largest exporter of RMG in the world, and RMG revenues and remittance from Bangladeshis working abroad are fuelling the 6% plus economic growth of Bangladesh in recent times. The banking and finance sector has also grown rapidly with much broader and extensive access, with the world acclaimed Grameen Bank and its founder Dr. M Yunus winning the Nobel Prize in 2006. Led by the pioneering efforts of Grameen Phone and Grameen Telecom, and aided by rural electrification and expansion of electricity generation (1.03 billion KWH in 1972, 37.68 billion KWH in 2009), communications, access to media and technology diffusion have transformed Bangladesh into a new millennium society.

The non-monetary achievements of Bangladesh have drawn even more attention. To name a few, the literacy rate shot up from 29.23 in 1981 to 55.90 in 2009, the mortality rate under age 5 (per 1,000 live births) dropped from 229.30 in 1972 to 47.80 in 2010, and the life expectancy at birth dramatically improved from 38.97 years in 1972 to 68.63 years in 2010. According to UNDP, between 1980 and 2012, Bangladesh's Human Development Index rose by 1.5% annually from 0.312 in 1980 to 0.515 today.

Admittedly the democratic and political achievements are nowhere near as shiny, but they are not negligible either. Since the early years of failed experiments with single party democracy, tragic assassinations and military coupes and autocratic route to presidential democracy, the country has steadily, albeit in a tumultuous fashion, emerged as a thriving, fiercely competitive and pluralistic parliamentary democracy. Despite the global trend of rising religious fundamentalism and increasing obsolescence of communism/socialism, the country has duly earned worldwide admiration for its inclusive style, even allowing the extremists of both types to fully participate in the political process. However, the largely Muslim and socially conservative electorate continues to overwhelmingly favor the moderate centrists (AL and BNP) led by two female leaders, thus exhibiting a level of electoral prudence and progressive bent normally expected of mature democracies in economically advanced countries.

To summarize, Bangladesh has exploded on the world scene as a state with stellar performance and enormous potential in economic and human development arenas, and as a progressive and secular democracy.

Despite having so much to celebrate, the nation is currently imploding from within due to a vicious cycle of political turbulence and internal violence. There is plenty of blames to go around, but that won't help in restoring the internal calm pivotal to the preservation of the stupendously successful state that has been built since liberation. However, the nation's history bears testimony to how powerful a captivating nationalistic slogan can be in inspiring a people to rise above sub-national rifts and rally to a universally greater cause. Forty plus years ago, it was Joy Bangla that called upon the pride and strength of ethnic nationalism as Bangalis. Perhaps today, Joy Bangladesh, can perform a similar magic in stoking and celebrating their state based nationalism as well, and thereby calling upon them to preserve and celebrate their enthralling achievements as Bangalis and Bangladeshis of all stripes.

Joy Bangla, Joy Bangladesh, Salam (Peace Upon) Bangladesh.

————————————-

Mo Chaudhury is a Professor of Practice in Finance at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Wisdom of Banning Jamaat

I have witnessed the diabolic acts of the 1971 Liberation War collaborators mostly hailing from the then Jamaat and am deeply opposed to their political philosophy of religion-based governance and violent tactics. But to me, the ultimate guiding and overarching principle in a secular democratic society must be the unfettered freedom of expression and tolerance for dissenting opinions including those that are extremist. It is the contest of ideas that the secular and progressive forces must win in a democratic manner. Fascist/repressive means to a noble end would make us no different from the very fascist/repressive forces that we aspire to defeat.

http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/03/25/wisdom-of-banning-jamaat-e-islami/

Mo Chaudhury

Wisdom of banning Jamaat-e-Islami

March 25, 2013

Photo: bdnews24.com

In pursuit of the Liberation War ideal of secular politics and governance, the 2/13 (February, 2013) movement demanded and the current regime is considering to impose a ban on the Jamaat (and Shibir). This commentary explores the wisdom of such a ban.

Do bans work? Human history is replete with examples that show that killing institutions, organisations and people never kills (gets rid of) the idea behind them. This applies to religious, political or ideas in other dimensions. In fact, the risks of the idea re-emerging stronger than before grows over time under maintained suppression.

Look no further than at our own history, the Pakistani rulers also thought they could get rid of the Bangalis in us through various bans and means of suppression, and what happened? Hosni Mubarak tried for 30 years to get rid of the Islamists of Muslim Brotherhood (Jamaat of Egypt), what happened? The Shah of Iran wanted to get rid of the Iranian Jamaatis, what happened? The European fascists tried to annihilate the Jewish people there, what happened? The Soviet socialists of Europe wanted to eradicate democracy and free enterprise, what happened? The Romans wanted to get rid of Jesus and his message, what happened? The Meccans drove Prophet Mohammed and his followers out, what happened? The list goes on and on to show that banning does not work. Banning your out is indeed a fatal fallacy, a dangerous course to travel.

How desirable is banning as a means? Secular authoritarian states (socialist/communist or dictatorship) have historically placed bans on religion-based political parties. It is rather uncommon to see mature or emerging democracies in today's world that overtly ban domestic religion-based political parties in an effort to advance secular tolerance and governance. Many religion-based organisations, national or international, have, however, been banned when their links to terrorist activities was evidenced to an independent judiciary.

Bangabandhu himself did not ban the parties that opposed the Liberation War either. Are we to say that Bangabandhu was any less wise or pro-liberation? Even in the midst of the coldest moments of the cold war, the USA never banned the ultra leftist, communist or anti-government parties. Canada, in fact, had the separatists of Quebec as Her Majesty's loyal opposition in the parliament. Has India banned the communist parties or the religion-leaning Bharatia Janata Party (that even came to power federally)? Even in the wake of the tragic 9/11 event, did the USA ban religion-based politics?

The principal reason democratic states do not find bans as a worthy means to silence or neutralise religion-based politics is that the bans constitute a gross violation of the greater ideal of freedom of expression and association. Surely, a state imposed ban on religion-based politics would enforce fascist secularism as in the communist, former soviet style, and Bathist dictatorial style states (like Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Ghaddafi's Libya or Assad's Syria). It is also the religion-based (like Sharia law based) states that would ban dissenting organisations.

Besides, once the precedence of banning is set, the majority may decide to use bans to prevent various practices that are not to their liking. It is an ominous path that may severely erode freedom of expression and human rights in general. For example, after banning the Jamaat as a political organisation, the current or a future government may decide to ban religious schools, sermons, garbs (like hijab, niqab) or even mosques (under ultra leftist government). Bans may also extend to non-religion spheres like the use of internet, clubs and eateries, etc. It is also possible that an ultra-right government may ban minority festivals and cultural practices in the name of social integration and ban communist parties because of their extremist views on political economy and due to the fear of reverting to an authoritarian single party system. Where does it stop once the floodgate is open?

What are the unintended consequences of banning the Jamaat? First, it is expected that initially a large number of organisers and activists of the Jamaat (and Shibir) would go underground in fear of retribution. It is worthwhile albeit painful to recall here that Bangabandhu and key political leaders of the Liberation War were assassinated when the Jamaat (and Shibir) went underground, not when they were active on the political scene.

Second, over time, the post-liberation generation of the Jamaat (and Shibir) leaders and activists would camouflage themselves by joining the right of centre leading parties such as the BNP or any other such variant/amalgam that may emerge in time. Ironically, although the right of centre alliance may weaken immediately following the ban, a party like the BNP will be the long-term beneficiary of banning the Jamaat. The BNP then need not accommodate the Jamaat base as much as under no ban to garner their electoral support and hence may be in a position to move more toward the centre, claiming the swing centrist base in the process. Further, the BNP will be freed from the stigma of allying with a party that opposed the Liberation War.

Third, the mighty external patrons of the religious right may become less generous to Bangladesh in banking, development finance, energy supply/finance, etc. Bangladeshis may conceivably face greater restrictions on work abroad, tourism, business and religious travel. While these direct and indirect costs may be worthwhile in the long-term in order to weaken dependence on religion-based regimes and organisations, the nation nonetheless should be aware of the potential steep price of a ban on religion-based politics, banking, medical and other NGO efforts.

In conclusion, bans rarely worked elsewhere other than in authoritarian states, they can open the ominous floodgate of opportunistic and repressive future bans, and their unintended consequences can extract a steep external price. Above all, in direct and gross violation of the Liberation War ideals, the banning of religion-based parties unequivocally usurps the freedom of expression and association for the segment of the post-liberation prajanma that is sympathetic to the cause of religion-based governance. The nation thus has to ponder seriously whether the unclean (undemocratic, fascist) means of banning to the noble end (of a more tolerant society) is justified. A country of believers (of various faiths, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim) cannot be made more secular than admirably it already is by political bans and policing of sermons; such zealous efforts may ultimately backfire by widening and reinforcing fears of losing religious freedom.

This author strongly supports the 2/13 movement's demand of due justice for the victims of 1971, but does not find banning religion-based politics as an acceptable, effective or beneficial means of protecting and promoting secular governance.

——————————
Mo Chaudhury is a Professor of Practice in Finance at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

 

Rationale for banning the Jamaat

http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/03/20/rationale-for-banning-jamaat-e-islami/

Mo Chaudhury

Rationale for banning Jamaat-e-Islami

March 20, 2013

Pressured by the weight of the 2/13 (February, 2013) movement, the current regime is contemplating on imposing a ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami (and in the process, Shibir). To be sure, banning the anti-liberation organizations cannot be accepted to make up for a failure to deliver due justice for the war crimes. The goal of the ban would then be to exorcise religion-based politics out of Bangladesh to ensure secular governance, a key component of the Liberation War ideals.

But was the Liberation War based on religion-based politics? No. The Pakistani regime did not invade Bangladesh in 1971 to impose religion-based governance; it was rather to sabotage the parliamentary majority of the Bangalis. Neither Bhutto's People's Party nor the military leaders in power had any affinity for the religion-based parties of Pakistan including the Jamaat. As India came forward to support the Liberation War, the Pakistani invaders stoked the pre-1947 communal tension and played the religion card to recruit local collaborators from the religion-based parties like the Jamaat.

What about the anti-liberation political stand of the Jamaat? This is the most popularly cited rationale for banning the party, but it is also the weakest one. Political environment changes over time and reasonable people do change their political beliefs. For example, many of the Awami League leaders of 1971, including Bangabandhu, were pioneers of the pre-1947 and post-1947 Muslim League and the creation of the then Pakistan along communal line; should that record of communal politics be held against them forever? While these leaders ultimately made the transition to creating a secular Bangladesh, numerous Bangladeshis of their generation (mindful of minority life in undivided India) were apprehensive of breaking up Pakistan in 1971 although they did not collaborate with the Pakistani invaders, and over time they turned out to be proud Bangladeshis. Now, should these senior generation Bangladeshis be condemned and ex-communicated in today's Bangladesh, 40 plus years later, for their 1971 anti-liberation political view? The answer is negative.

It is indeed time to redefine pro-liberation and anti-liberation in today's Bangladesh and going forward. The sovereignty of Bangladesh is not at stake and neither is the Bangali way of life. It stands to reason that pro-liberation today should simply mean current allegiance to the state of Bangladesh. An extended definition could include allegiance to the key founding ideals, namely democracy, unfettered freedom of expression, secular governance and equitable economic opportunities for all. [Notice that one (socialism) of the founding ideals had to evolve along with the world around Bangladesh]. Interestingly, using the extended definition, the Jamaat is anti-liberation because of its opposition to secular governance, the socialist/communist parties are anti-liberation due to their extremist economic and ultimate single party stand, and the AL and BNP are anti-liberation since they are the most notable and frequent violators of freedom of expression and human rights. Thus, the extended definition cannot be binding and is practically non-operational.

Is secular governance at heightened risk in Bangladesh due to the legally valid status of the Jamaat and other religion-based organizations? First, the religious right never garnered more than 12% of the popular support in the national elections. This is a rather remarkable secular feat for a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim, with most Muslims fiercely proud of their belief, often demonstrating high sensitivity to global events concerning Islam and strong solidarity with Muslims in peril elsewhere.

Second, if there was ever any doubt that the nation has become oblivious to the memory and the ideals of the Liberation War that includes secular governance, it has been convincingly put to rest by the countrywide massive support across all demographics for the 2/13 movement. In an illustrious rendezvous, the nation is back to the future of 1971, the Red-green-Yellow spirit of 1971 just remained deceptively dormant all these years.

Third, the country did witness undesirable influence of the religious right in some instances such as the recognition of the majority religion in the constitution. Even the party that led the Liberation War retained this anti-secular amendment through their previous and current mandates. Strangely, the 2/13 movement also chose not to pursue the withdrawal of this amendment with any intensity. But, so far the amendment has not been used detrimentally by any party.

In terms of politics on the ground, the current ruling party did ally with the Jamaat previously and the current opposition party is in electoral alliance with the Jamaat, thus lending legitimacy to the existence and continuation of religion-based politics. Both the ruling party and the opposition party also maintain very strong and cordial relationships with dictatorial religion-based regimes elsewhere that are known financiers and promoters of extremist religious views, activities and governance. Both parties have also shown unacceptable level of inaction in arresting and punishing violence against the minority by members of the majority religion.

Despite the spate of explicit and/or tacit accommodations of the religious right by the two major parties, there is no evidence that the religion-based political organizations had any palpable impact on the governance of the country or on citizens at large. While the ruling alliance keeps blaming the Jamaat (and Shibir) for street level violence, in reality violent activism by the two major parties since 1971 has been manifold more frequent, intense and fatal.

In conclusion, the demand for banning religion-based organizations seems at best an emotional one, out of fear (of a 1971 type repetition) that is unfounded, a desire for avengement of the 1971 wrongs that is not warranted, and disappointment with the war crime proceedings. At the worst, it is a political opportunism that the nation is already plagued with.

For full disclosure, this author declares firm solidarity with the 2/13 movement's demand of due justice for the victims of 1971 and deep disapproval of the philosophy of religion-based governance.

——————————–
Mo Chaudhury is a Professor at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Ideological Compromises/Sacrifices by AL and BNP to Win Governance Power

http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/price-of-electoral-win/

March 7, 2013

Price of electoral win

Mo Chaudhury

    

Rate this post

Photo: Jashim Salam/ Drik News

In the highly charged emotional environment of the 2/13 (February, 2013) Projonmo Movement, making a dispassionate analysis of the undercurrent of political dynamics is rather challenging without being labeled as a partisan of some sort. But that in itself makes it even more imperative that the analysis is done.  The purpose of this commentary is to explore how the two major parties, AL and BNP, are paying dearly, in terms of concessions to the extremists, for their electoral wins.

The situation for BNP is truly dire. What years of complacency with the non-secular agenda of the country’s religious right organisations could not do has now been done by a few days of the 2/13 movement. People across the land have made it abundantly known that they disapprove of the political ideology of religion-based governance, especially when it is promoted by parties that had opposed the very creation of the country and are still being led by war criminals.
BNP was established by a freedom fighter and catered to the post-75 need and desire of the nation for a strong and viable right of centre political alternative as the left of centre AL could not rebuild the nation’s war-ravaged and famine-stricken economy fast enough along the pro-socialist route.
AL also showed at that time an unpalatable socialist/communist tendency of limiting freedom of expression, and an increased appetite for single party dominance, which were a gross violation of the driving ideal of the bloody Liberation War, which was freedom in all senses of the term. Once the excitement of victory abated and people had a chance to re-assess the internal and external circumstances, it became apparent that AL had led the country too far along the then Russia-India axis of socialist and ultra-secular influence.
Capitalising on this shift toward greater religious, economic and political sovereignty of the young nation, BNP (and later Jatiyo Party) was successful in bringing down the mighty AL and its extreme left allies. Instrumental in this process was the rehabilitation and re-emergence of the once detested religious right organisations as a legitimate political force in post-75 Bangladesh.
Based on the adage that the foe of my foe is my ally, BNP (and even AL, for a brief period) found alliance with the religious right necessary and politically rewarding in the late 1980s.
Following the 1991 election, BNP became increasingly entrenched in their marriage of convenience with the religious right as AL won the 1996 contest and started to re-engage with the extreme left parties, the latter also on the hunt for achieving long-term political goals following the fall of the Soviet socialist block and the liberalisation campaign of China. Over the next two election cycles, the parallel alliances would become formal and make the political landscape more polarised, antagonistic and outright lethal (at the street level), and render both BNP and AL hostages to their respective extremist partners.
AL won a landslide in 2009, mainly due to the election promise of bringing the war criminals of 1971 to justice. With the miraculous pace of economic growth since BNP’s re-navigation in 1975 toward private enterprise and development partnership with the West and the rich Muslim-dominated nations, the nation was more affluent than ever since liberation.
Meantime, the post-liberation generations of Bangladeshis had reached voting age without experiencing economic hardship, substantive threat to individual liberty, or misery of Soviet/China style “democracy” and state-controlled enterprises. The electorate of the new millennium was ready and eager to dial back to a time it had never known, the time of the 1971 Liberation War. The born-again extreme left understood this undercurrent more than and well ahead of anyone else. By long-term strategic and short-term convenient alignment with AL, they have reaped and are continuing to harness political and governance dividends way beyond their negligible electorate base simply by leveraging upon AL’s priority of governance power over its historic centrist ideology.
From disrupting the extremely rewarding and vital economic partnerships with the international development, trade and financial partners to the signing of arms and nuclear plant deals with Russia, and from using the judiciary and law enforcement more extensively as an extended arm of the government to efforts to gain greater state control of business enterprises, the writing has been on the wall for a while now.
And therein lies the dilemma for AL. But graver is the stake for the nation as the risk is greater than ever of effective control of governance being lost by the centrist AL forces with the right of centre BNP already marginalised by the 2/13 Projonmo Movement. The only time AL had usurped the freedom of political expression by legislation was the unfortunate Baksal attempt at the height of Soviet socialist influence.
Raising rightful demand for due justice for the war crimes of 1971 is how the 2/13 Projonmo Movement garnered the solidarity and imagination of the entire nation. But how the demands of the movement have evolved and literally forced AL to seek legislative ban on religion-based political parties is eerily reminiscent of that long-ago post-liberation dynamics that resulted in tragic and tumultuous events.
Here are some excerpts from the official website (http://cpbbd.org/#con) of the Communist Party of Bangladesh. “CPB has put forward a programme and strategy .. with the ultimate goal of socialism-communism.” “A Grand Alliance led by Awami league is now ruling Bangladesh. .. But like other governments of the past 30 years, is continuing to broadly pursue the same imperialism-dependent neo-liberal policies.” “Simultaneous and parallel actions with broadest possible forces, including AL, maintaining independent positions of all participating forces of struggle, is the only logical form of political polarisation by which the task of fighting communalism and fundamentalism on the one hand and advancing the task of building up a \’left-democratic alternative\’ on the other can be combined.”
Unless AL wishes to lead the nation away from the ideals of Bangabandhu and the Liberation War, and into single-party “democracy” and state-controlled enterprises, it is indeed time to re-assess its partnership with the extreme left. If it is okay to ban religion-based politics to protect secular governance, shouldn’t it also be okay to ban politics based on state control to protect multi-party democracy and private enterprise? Or perhaps, instead of banning, AL and the nation should look beyond the euphoria of the moment, and look back to the democratic ideal of unfettered liberty that led to the creation of the country and the policies and partnerships that led to the emergence of Bangladesh as a thriving secular democracy and an enviable economic engine.
The writer is a Professor of Practice in Finance at McGill University,
Montreal, Canada. Email: mo.chaudhury@mcgill.ca